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Introduction 
 
Since 2010 successive governments in England have embarked on an ambitious project to accelerate 
policy reforms designed to extricate state-funded schools from the politics and bureaucracy of local 
government and transform them into academies and free schools, otherwise known as ‘state-funded 
independent schools’ (DfE 2016a). A corollary of this is that governors – those responsible for holding 
senior school leaders to account for the educational and financial performance of schools – have 
acquired new freedoms and flexibilities, namely budgetary and legal powers to operate outside the 
remit of local government control (DfE 2015). Concurrently and somewhat paradoxically, this shift 
towards school autonomy has given rise to greater steering from government and non-government 
agencies who now regard school governance to be integral to school leadership, school management 
and public accountability in general (Ofsted 2015), so much so that they intervene in placing limits on 
meanings and practices of ‘good governance’ (DfE 2015) and seek to render the contribution of 
governors amenable to the scrutiny of external regulators (Ofsted 2015).   
 
These policy shifts not only highlight the false distinction between regulation and deregulation so 
endemic to the marketisation of state education (Aalbers 2016), but point to the ways in which 
government and non-government agencies are implicated in how governors are active in their own 
self-government. These reforms to school governance can therefore be described as the function of 
‘introducing additional freedom through additional control and intervention’ (Foucault 2008, p. 67) or 
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‘governmentality’: the ‘invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses and devices for exercising 
power and intervening upon particular problems’ (Rose 1999, p. 19). For Foucault (1991, p. 100), the 
art of government – or governmentality – concerns perfecting means for optimising the welfare, 
education, health, security and efficiency of a population, and so the population emerges as ‘a datum, 
as a field of intervention and as an objective of governmental techniques’. By way of Foucault, Rose 
(1999), Dean (1999), Lemke (2007) and others (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991) have extended and 
adapted these perspectives to explore how neoliberal mentalities of government act upon citizens to 
ensure they internalise responsibility for certain social risks and externalities – illness, security, 
unemployment and poverty for example – as a matter of ethical and moral obligation. This chapter 
can be situated broadly within the field of governmentality studies of education (Ball 2013; Christie 
and Sidhu 2006; Peters 2003; Pongratz 2006), but its key focus and contribution is the application of 
a Foucauldian analytic approach as a methodological framing for producing new and original insights 
concerning school governance, specifically how governors are implicated in the ‘business’ of state 
transformation and imposing market discipline on schools and each other. 
Taking evidence from a three-year study of school governance in England conducted between 2012 
and 2015 (ESRC Grant Ref. ES/K001299/1), the focus and originality of this contribution is to determine 
why and how governors are being primed as expert publics, and to document the techniques or 
rationalities (moral, juridical, constitutional, fiscal or organisational) by which governors are 
summoned and activated in governmental fields of power. This includes paying close attention to the 
operation of ‘regimes of truth’ (Garland 1999, p. 29), specifically how certain attitudes, judgements or 
behaviours are elevated to the status of ‘truths’ or self-evident claims, and how the market in general 
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functions as a partage between true and false statements about what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
governance.  
 
Such a methodological approach is intended to make a distinctive contribution to the school 
governance literature by interlinking the everyday spaces and practices occupied by governors with 
the generation of new scalar hierarchies and accountability infrastructures that consolidate forms of 
state power.  Hitherto studies on school governance have maintained a formal rational or instrumental 
focus on measuring the effectiveness of governors in affecting strategy, school improvement and 
holding others to account (Balarin et al. 2008; Dean et al. 2007), with particular reference to the 
impact of chairs (Hill and James 2015), external advisors (Earley et al. 2016), socio-economic factors 
(James et al. 2011) and head teachers and inspection reports (Baxter 2016) on governing body 
performance. This chapter is not concerned with whether current reforms to school governance are 
good or bad, whether certain accountability measures are corrosive of the autonomy required by 
schools to self-innovate, or whether certain governors are more adept compared to others at 
discharging their duties in holding others to account. Rather, the focus here is to trace the assumptions 
and exclusions shaping dominant discourses of school governance – as well as their connection with 
economic rationalities and the reordering of public priorities – and to document their punitive effects 
on shaping the moral conduct of governors as custodians of public interest.  These interventions in 
discussions about school governance are important precisely because they force us to confront the 
new modalities of power, hierarchy and expertise through which governors are called upon to make 
4 
 
new accommodations within and adjustments to neoliberal practice. 
 
Analytics of governmentality 
 
During the 1970s Foucault presented a series of lectures at the Collège de France in which he outlined 
his theory of governmentality, taken to mean the 'rationalisation of governmental practice in the 
exercise of political sovereignty' (Foucault 2008, p. 4). Here governmentality denotes the study of 
points of contact, convergence and co-determination between the ground logics or deeper frames of 
everyday practice and discourse, and the crystallisation of broader and more persistent societal 
configurations, including the state itself, which Foucault (2004, p. 77) characterised as ‘nothing else 
than the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’. As Lemke (2007, p. 44) shows, 
Foucault veered away from any systematic representation of the development of the political-
administrative structures and practices of the state, and instead developed a historical or 
‘genealogical’ analysis of ‘the multiple and diverse relations between the institutionalization of a state 
apparatus and historical forms of subjectivation’.  
 
Foucault specifically linked government to the development of ‘techniques and procedures for 
directing human behaviour’ (Foucault 1997, p. 82), namely those activities that undertake ‘to conduct 
individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what 
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they do and for what happens to them’ (Foucault 1997, p. 68). Governmentality or the ‘conduct of the 
conduct’ (Rose 1999, p. 19) thus entails the ‘administration of life itself’ (McKee 2009, p. 466). Hence 
Foucault (2008, p. 67) characterises governmentality as ‘the function of producing, breathing life into, 
and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom through additional control and 
intervention’. By operationalising a governmentality approach, the focus of this chapter concerns how 
governors are captured in governmental fields of power and why such mobilisations are important to 
the kinds of rapid, accelerated deregulation shaping the school system in general. Deregulation 
signifies a system of minimal state intervention in which agents are liberated from certain constraints, 
namely government-mandated rules and restrictions, and who in turn acquire ‘freedoms’ to self-
government. But self-government and the will to self-determination is always already prefigured by 
‘regimes of truth’ (Garland 1999, p, 29) which shape and guide such behavior. From a governmentality 
perspective, ‘to govern is to presuppose the freedom of the governed. To govern humans is not to 
crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and utilize it for one’s own objectives’ (Rose 1999, 
p. 4). On this understanding it is crucial to examine how governors are empowered to pursue certain 
freedoms, but also to explain how those freedoms are acted upon and utilised for the purpose for 
sustaining more encompassing forms of state power or statecraft. 
 
School governance 
 
School governance in England encompasses a field of activity and intervention directed at bringing 
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certain professional practices and technical judgements to bear upon the actions of senior school 
leaders (those responsible for the day-to-day operation of schools). In effect these practices and 
judgements are designed to bring about improvements to service delivery by making senior school 
leaders accountable for outcomes relating to the educational and financial performance of the school. 
The actual doing of school governance consists of staff, parent and community volunteers or 
‘governors’ (collectively known as the ‘governing body’ for a school) utilising specific judgements and 
their own claims to knowledge to support and challenge senior school leaders on key decisions relating 
to strategy and performance. Since the 1980s, state-funded schools in England have relied upon a 
stakeholder or representative model of governance that includes the election and appointment of 
different constituents to the governing body, namely parents, staff, local councillors and members of 
the wider community.   
 
Over the last six years, however, successive governments have discredited the model of stakeholder 
governance in favour of a skills-based model of governance, with significant implications for the 
composition and overall function of governing bodies. This has been undergirded by strong 
government opposition to the bureau-professional role of local authorities in the management of 
schools, now considered to be inefficient, unresponsive and unaccountable (GOV.UK 2016). (Local 
authorities refer to provincial or ‘county’ government agencies comprised of elected local councillors 
and civil servants with powers to intervene in the running of schools). There have been important 
strategic and tactical dimensions to these claims, including the legitimation of new spaces and 
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arguments for alternative, non-government providers of state-funded education, preferably 
professional groups and expert administrators who can recalibrate schools as manageable entities 
with demonstrable gains that can be measured and audited to the satisfaction of external regulators 
and funders. These tactics in governing are crucial to the contemporary policy moment and to 
consolidating forms of state power in general since they work to locate schools within ‘a regime of 
visibility’ and ‘a grid of codeability’ (Rose 1988, p. 187), in effect making schools more amendable to 
the statistical mapping, administration and scrutiny of government and non-government authorities. 
While a sizable proportion of state-funded schools from the primary school sector still remain wedded 
to the bureau-professionalism of local authorities (called ‘maintained’ schools), the majority of state-
funded school setups in the secondary school sector are academies and free schools (DfE 2016a), 
many of which are managed by powerful bureaucracies and professional groups drawn from the 
private sector. 
 
Academies and free schools (legally the same thing) are different to ‘maintained’ schools in that they 
possess freedoms to determine their own budget spending, curriculum (subject to the national 
curriculum), admissions (subject to the admissions code), staff pay and conditions, and length of 
school day and term. But school autonomy must be earned before freedom can be granted. A 
requirement for schools looking to convert to academy status is that their governing bodies 
demonstrate sufficient ‘professionalism’ and conduct themselves in a way that is amenable to the 
governance of external regulators and funders (Wilkins 2016). As Mckee (2009, p. 468-469) argues, 
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governmentality ‘emphasizes that individuals not only are subject to domination by external actors 
but are also active in their own government’.  This partly explains why the ‘hollowing out’ of local 
authorities has not resulted in less bureaucracy on the ground or less regulation from above, nor has 
it diminished elements of hierarchy in the way that some schools are run. The paradox of neoliberal 
deregulation is that decentralising reforms often entail the generation of new hierarchies and tight, 
centralised accountability consolidate forms of state power (Lingard, Martino, and Rezai-Rashti 2013; 
Ozga 2009). 
 
Neoliberal deregulation 
 
Understood from a governmentality perspective, neoliberalism can be characterised as a mobile 
assemblage of technologies and strategies utilised for the purpose of managing populations so that, 
in the absence of direct government control, individuals and organisations may govern themselves 
(Ong 2006). Some of the most ambitious and far-reaching reforms to affect education in England have 
occurred in the last six years under similar arrangements. The scale and pace of these reforms have 
been unprecedented, even when compared to the rate of expansion of equivalent market-based 
reforms to education in the USA (National Alliance 2016) and Sweden (Weale 2015). Key to the success 
of these reforms has been to conscript non-government actors and entities – private companies, 
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos) and even citizens – to internalise 
responsibility for the kinds of risks, insecurities and inequities formerly managed by the state; that is, 
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‘routinely engaging in preventing harms that had been previously treated as ‘externalities’’ (Shamir 
2008, p. 2). The creation of academies as administratively self-governing entities for example means 
that the state is relieved of the requirement to regulate and deliver such services, and instead the 
state assumes the role of market facilitator or ‘market-maker, as initiator of opportunities, as re-
modeller and moderniser’ (Ball 2007, p. 82).   
 
Yet while these reforms can be described as anti-statism and anti-welfare – that is, against the vision 
of a ‘strong state’ – they are not straightforwardly anti-state since they necessitate forms and means 
of active politics or soft government that work to supplement and support market orientations and 
attitudes where they do not exist (Wilkins 2016). From a governmentality perspective, neoliberal 
deregulation signals both the retreat of state power (‘roll back’) but also its expansion and explosion 
(‘roll out’) through the creation of possibilities vis-à-vis the market apparatus for acting upon subjects 
‘so that the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed’ (Foucault 1982, p. 790). In this 
configuration ‘government itself becomes a sort of enterprise whose task it is to universalize 
competition and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions’ 
(Lemke 2001, p. 197).  These contradictory, albeit complimentary forces lay at the heart of recent 
reforms to school governance. 
 
Apart from marketisation, a key driver of development to school governance has been widespread 
‘disintermediation’, namely ‘the withdrawal of power and influence from intermediate or ‘meso-level’ 
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educational authorities that operate between local schools and national entities’ (Lubienski 2014, p. 
424). Disintermediation has been particularly pronounced in England since the Conservative-led 
Coalition government came to power in 2010. Local authorities have experienced huge budget cuts to 
their spending (BBC 2013; Riley-Smith 2016) and related to this, a diminished capacity to intervene in 
the running of state-funded schools. A caveat to these arrangements is a requirement for schools to 
exercise ‘good governance’ (DfE 2015). This includes a strict focus on risk-based approaches to 
regulation, namely rigorous and continuous internal auditing, strategic planning, performance 
management and compliance checking. Good governance serves not only to prepare schools for the 
kinds of devolved risk that accompany self-government but also bureaucratic overload – or what I call 
bureaucratic decentralism.  
 
Bureaucratic decentralism 
 
From a governmentality perspective, bureaucratic decentralism constitutes a technology of 
governance or mode of insertion by which governors are captured and ‘responsibilised’ (Clarke 2005) 
through governmental fields of power as bureaucratic operatives and ancillaries to the market.  
Bureaucratic decentralism occurs when bureaucracy is devolved from government to non-
government agents and organisations; in this case, from the site of local authorities to the site of 
service providers, school leaders and governors. This means that schools are not only subject to 
bureaucracy from outside but transformed and activated from the inside-out as producers of 
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bureaucracy. ‘Instead of disappearing, bureaucracy has changed its form’, Fisher claims (2009, p. 20). 
‘And this new, decentralized form has allowed it to proliferate’. The suggestion here is that state 
education in England is not living through a ‘post-bureaucratic school system’ (Gove 2009). On the 
contrary, self-government by schools entails a sharper focus on business management theories and 
practices or ‘corporate accountability’ (Ranson 2010).  
 
Bureaucratic decentralism therefore occurs when schools experience an admixture of state 
independence and market dependence. State independence ensures that schools are ‘liberated’ from 
elements of hierarchical, top-down rule and the constraints and regulations imposed by external 
authorities; in this case, the politics and bureaucracy of local authorities. At the same time, the state 
continues to intervene in schools, albeit indirectly through forcing schools to submit to the regularities 
and vagaries of the market. Liberalisation is therefore enabled and controlled by ‘an enforcement 
mechanism designed to control the operation of the system’s constituent institutions, instruments 
and markets’ (Spotton 1999, p. 971). Consider that the reforms to school governance have been 
accompanied by a rhetoric of derision aimed at so-called ‘amateurish’ governance (Wilshaw quoted 
in Cross 2014) and stakeholder models of governance shaped by proportional representation and 
wider community involvement (Wilkins 2016). This includes calls for the removal of parent governors 
(Dfe 2016b) and their replacement by ‘business people’ or experts (GOV.UK 2013), specifically people 
with the ‘right skills’ (GOV.UK 2015) who can open up the internal operation of schools to greater 
political and public scrutiny. As I will go onto show in further detail, the work of governors has been 
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more or less successfully integrated into a set of strategies and techniques that suggest some form of 
capture by political power from the centre vis-à-vis the prerogatives and discipline of the market 
apparatus. These insights are helpful for demonstrating the significance of the analytics of 
governmentality for it draws attention to the interdependence between practices or mentalities of 
government and the forms and formation of the self, between ‘political objectives and person 
conduct’ (Rose 1999, p. 149) 
 
Governing through professionalisation 
 
In 2013 the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Schools, Lord Nash, addressed the Independent 
Academies Association (IAA) by saying 
 
People should be appointed on a clear prospectus and because of their skills and expertise as 
governors; not simply because they represent particular interest groups…Running a school is 
in many ways like running a business, so we need more business people coming forward to 
become governors. (GOV.UK 2013) 
 
Later in 2014, Sir Michael Wilshaw, the Chief Inspector of Schools in England and Head of Ofsted 
(Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills), said ‘the role of governors must be 
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re-examined’ and ‘there’s a need for professional governance to move beyond the current 
‘amateurish’ approach to overseeing schools’ (Wilshaw quoted in Cross 2014). Demands for the 
professionalisation of governors can be viewed as a tactic employed by government and non-
government (supportive and regulative) agencies to ensure that the ‘right’ kinds of people populate 
and steer the internal management of schools, and that any appeal to proportional representation or 
wider community involvement in school governance is exhausted through pragmatic demands for 
market-responsive, market-ready actors who can make schools intelligible as businesses. 
 
This is not simply a call for more professionals to enter the world of school governance (see School 
Governors One-Stop Shop (SGOSS) slogan ‘make schools your business’) but also for existing governors 
to be recalibrated as professionals. From a governmentality perspective, the professionalisation of 
governors points to ‘how techniques of the self might interact with techniques of governing' (Dean 
2015, p. 365). The requirement for governors to behave professionally can be considered a strategy 
for entrenching technocratic decision-making within the day-to-day practices of school governance 
and activating governors as economic-rational actors: ‘autonomous, self-determined and self-
sustaining subjects’ (Shamir 2016, p. 7). But a condition of successful self-government is not the 
existence of professionals alone but the stock of ‘technical/administrative knowledge’ (Apple 1993, p. 
309) they are able to successfully mobilise in the governing of schools. 
 
I think as we move towards a more responsible, professional era of management 
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responsibility then what you’ll be looking for will be more diverse.  You’ll be looking not just 
for people who are rooted in the community but I think you’ll be looking for people with skills 
to offer. (Gordon, Company Secretary, Millard) 
 
A chance to bring professionalism and a development, wider developments in education, to 
the community, and put them before them so they can either have an understanding of them, 
or work with them, or help us to shape them…We have to manage our own destiny.  We 
haven’t got the local authority behind us providing a backup of any form anyway, whether it’s 
audit or financial.  (Dennis, Chair of Governors, Millard) 
 
Technical/administrative knowledge in legal, audit, ICT, finance, business management and strategy 
is particularly sought-after cultural capital in these contexts. This is because of the risk and (limited) 
liability that accompanies self-government in an increasingly deregulated school system. The removal 
of the safety net of local authorities and the empowerment of schools as separate legal entities with 
devolved powers to administratively self-govern means that school governance has become 
increasingly preoccupied with New Public Management techniques and related cost-benefit, risk- 
management and sustainability principles. The everyday work of governors entails, for example, the 
ritual undertaking of evidentiary meetings, budget control, collective bargaining, training and 
upskilling, consensus building, compliance monitoring, income generation, strategic planning, school-
to-school brokering, future-proofing and rebounding, competitive tendering and implementing 
15 
 
systems of control in general. This includes performance monitoring senior school leaders with explicit 
links to the 'goal-governed steering of outputs and outcomes, accompanied by the monitoring of 
targets' (Ozga 2009, p. 149). 
 
A close inspection of the content and logic of the everyday work of governors opens up possibilities 
for explaining how mundane activities and performances come to sustain the ‘technocratic 
embedding of routines of neoliberal governance’ (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 384) within the day-to-day 
administration of schools. As already pointed out, governmentality denotes the study of points of 
convergence and co-determination between everyday practice and discourse and the sedimentation 
of broader and more persistent societal configurations. Audit and compliance rituals for example 
enable governing bodies to comfortably affirm themselves as agents of professional authority and 
expert publics of ‘deliverology’ (Butt and Gunter 2007), namely as collective bodies ‘fit for purpose’ in 
the pursuit of improved outcomes through better target setting and performance monitoring. These 
techniques of professionalisation also aim to ensure that internally managed processes specific to the 
operation of schools are not beyond the scope of ordinary governments, and which can be audited 
and verified by different external authorities as a ‘navigable space of commensurability, equivalence 
and comparative performance’ (Lingard, Martino and Rezai-Rashti 2013, p. 542). As Rose (1999, p. 
156) indicates, ‘Professionals must now act in such a way that the action might be, at some future 
moment, defensible in terms of the criteria and evidentiary requirements of another profession and 
body of expert knowledge, that of the law’. 
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 The above suggests the governmentalisation of school governance – that is, a means or site ‘for the 
population and its optimization (in terms of wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efﬁciency) and the 
forms of knowledge and technical means appropriate to it’ (Dean 1999, p. 20). But these achievements 
are far beyond the practical means of governments. Hence the concrete, practical work of governors 
is so crucial to emerging forms of statecraft at this time – a time when deregulation of state education 
and the decommissioning of local authorities as overseers of schools has provoked concerns of a 
regulatory gap. Moreover, ‘good governance’ demands neutral expert administration or de-
politicisation, and the ‘pursuit of the disenchantment of politics by economics’ (Davies 2014, p. 4). 
 
Governing through de-politicisation 
 
Central to the reforms of school governance since 2010 has been a rigid focus on economic 
management and the tempering or mitigation of risk. This includes the fashioning of schools as de-
politicised spaces and businesses that assume the economic enterprise form; that is, organisations 
which adopt responsibility for the kinds of ‘externalities’ or risks formerly absorbed and managed by 
state entities and actors. Increasingly, government definitions of ‘good governance’ are formulated in 
a way that undermine democracy within school governance. Proportional representation on the 
governing body (such as role of elected members of local authority governors and parent governors) 
is permissible only where it contributes to the smooth oversight of the educational and financial 
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performance of the school (see GOV.UK 2013, 2015, 2016). In other words, the democratic function 
of school governance is permitted but only conditionally so and only in circumstances where the 
governing body is sufficiently ‘professionalised’ and populated with the ‘right people’ in possession of 
the ‘right skills’: ‘what makes your contribution so important isn’t the particular group you represent, 
it’s the skills, expertise and wisdom you bring to the running of a school’ (GOV.UK 2015). As Kristol 
(2004, p.  176) argues, ‘if you want self-government, you are only entitled to it if that ‘self’ is worthy 
of governing’. 
 
One of the problems with the whole approach to having amateur, part-time unpaid governing 
body and council.  Well, councillors aren’t particularly underpaid now, I’m paid, but governors 
certainly are.  One of the problems with them is that they don’t know the right questions to 
ask.  And if you don’t know the right questions then of course the wool can be pulled. (Craig, 
LEA governor, Moorhead) 
 
I think the most difficult governors are parent governors…They’ve got a child at the school, 
they want the best for that child, and it’s very difficult for them to sort out what’s right for the 
whole school and what’s right for little Johnny…So I would say that parent governors is, I think, 
the most difficult one to keep control.  Community governors come because we take them 
from what expertise they can bring.  (Audrey, Chair of Governors, Ballard’s Wood) 
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De-politicisation of the governing body is one example of the governmentalisation of school 
governance since it points to a set of strategies and techniques by which the discrete actions of 
governors are integrated into general mechanisms that sustain the public ambitions of governments.  
De-politicisation of school governance means eliminating the opacity of political discourse through 
the alleviation of sectional interests and partisanship, the aggregation of voices, the diminution of 
dissensus, and the replacement of ‘amateurs’ with ‘professionals’. This helps to explain why 
governments since 2010 have been particularly keen for multi-academy trusts (MATs) – private 
sponsors contracted by central government to run publicly-funded schools – to oversee the delivery 
and regulation of public education: they use ‘professionals to hold individual school-level heads to 
account’ (DfE 2016b, p. 50). Moreover, professionals as market-ready, market-responsive actors are 
more likely to recalibrate the internal management of schools through the imaginary of the market 
and therefore, given the regulation of the market by the state (Aalbers 2016), assist in bringing the 
gaze of government to bear upon the actions of governors more effectively. 
 
Hence governors have been spotlighted as integral to organisational preparedness, answerability, ad 
hoc adaption and response, primarily to assuage any fears of a ‘missing middle’ (Hill 2012) or 
regulatory gap and to open up the internal management of schools to greater scrutiny from external 
authorities. From a governmentality approach, the prioritising of governors as accountants, lawyers 
and managers who can subject senior school leaders to constant processes of target-setting, 
measurement, comparison and evaluation highlights the significance of the imaginary of the market 
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as a disciplinary tool in shaping the conduct of governors. At the heart of these reforms is a logic or 
rationality of government specifically aimed at ‘the epistemological dissolution of the distinction 
between economy and society’ (Shamir 2008, p. 14) or what Foucault calls the ‘introduction of 
economy into political practice’ (1991, p. 92). De-politicisation therefore can be understood as integral 
to the governmentalisation of school governance since it facilitates conditions for rescaling the local, 
that is, eliminating the vagaries and specificity of political discourse and democratic consultation that 
might otherwise obstruct the smooth, efficient oversight of the school as a business. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have moved beyond a conventional formal rational, instrumental approach to school 
governance, namely one that seeks to redress problems of inefficiency in the way that some governors 
conduct themselves (Balarin et al. 2008; Earley et al. 2016), and instead adopted a governmentality 
approach that seeks ‘an open and critical relation to strategies for governing’ (Rose, 1999, p. 19), 
namely one that is attentive to the presuppositions, assumptions and exclusions undergirding the 
identification of ‘problems’ surrounding school governance (problems surrounding ‘amateur’, 
‘unprofessional’ or ‘unskilled’ governors for example). Such an innovative and novel approach to 
school governance serves to document the operation and effects of ‘regimes of truth’ (Garland 1999, 
p, 29) so as to demonstrate how governors are acted upon and transformed as objects and subjects 
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of government. 
 
It is no coincidence that the acceleration in reforms to state education in England since 2010 – notably, 
the expansion of the academies programme coupled increased school autonomy and shrinking local 
government support/oversight – has coincided with greater steering of school governance from the 
centre, albeit steering conducted through the paradigm of the market. Increasingly, governors are 
expected to hold themselves and others to account on the basis of corporate and performance 
conceptions of accountability (Ranson 2010) for example. As already evidenced in the chapter, 
governors are conscripted to a service agent role under the duty to carry out checks and balances or 
compliance monitoring as well as utilise data (specifically, financial data, pupil attainment scores and 
staff performance data) to enhance accountability to the funders, regulators and parents as 
consumers (DfE 2015). Moreover, governors now find themselves subject to a whole barrage of 
external and internal monitoring, including self-evaluation, skills audit, inspection and even 
‘competency frameworks’ (DfE 2016b). 
 
These new policy logics and technologies are integral to the development of new scalar relations from 
the local through to the national and are generative of new infrastructures of accountability that, in 
effect, work to facilitate the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Rose 1999, p. 19). A governmentality approach to 
school governance is therefore imperative to the contemporary policy moment since it provides 
important analytical and conceptual strategies for tracing the techniques and rationalities by which 
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the discrete actions of governors are integrated into general mechanisms that sustain the public 
ambitions of governments. This is not to deny the contingent, performative nature of school 
governance, which demands close attention to how policy enactments in schools unfold contextually 
through the interaction of locally situated actors (Ball, Maguire and Braun 2012). Nor does it 
presuppose a priori coherence of policy enactments across different institutional settings and sites. It 
is important to be sensitive to critiques of a governmentality approach, namely that such accounts fail 
to highlight the ‘messy actualities’ of particular neo-liberal projects as geo-political constructs (Larner 
2000, p. 14) and sometimes result in somewhat ‘reified and homogenous accounts of modern power’ 
which falsely portray ‘forms of power/knowledge as monolithic, with state practices fitting seamlessly 
with practices of self-creation’ (Bevir 2010, p. 425). However, the pressure for schools to 
‘professionalise’ and de-politicise their governing body – in effect, prioritise only those directives and 
requirements that make themselves answerable as competitive, customer-oriented, 'high-reliability’, 
cost-effective, sufficiently business-driven organisations (Wilkins 2015, 2016) – means that the 
imagery of the market both constrains and delimits the kinds of agency possible in the field of school 
governance. 
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